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blood suppliers insurers even where blood impurities were medically undetectable, would discourage or do irreparable harm to
14
a function that is vitally necessary.
Labeling the transaction a "service" or a "sale" is misleading and conceals the real issues in question. Whether a hospital

or independent blood bank is involved, the courts, after inquiring into medical facts concerning blood transfusions and the
risks involved for both the patient and the supplier, should decide whether the policy behind strict tort or warranty liability
is appropriate to suppliers of blood. The extension of legal liability in blood transfusion cases must keep pace with the medical
development in this field, and perhaps a degree of non-fault
liability would provide impetus toward achieving a completely

safe transfusion.
Anthony J. Bruscato

WATER RESOURCES

-

LIMITATIONS ON CONSUMPTION

OF

SUBTERRANEAN WATER

While engaged in secondary recovery operations, defendant
oil operator withdrew fresh water from a shallow sand and
14. For a discussion of the medical consideration, see Note, 42 MINN. L. REV.
640 (1948); Blood Transfusions-Medicolegal Responsibilities, 163 A.M.A.J.
283 (1957) ; Medicolegal Aspects of Blood Transfusion, 151 A.M.A.J. 1435
(1953) ; Prevention of Accidents in Blood Transfusions, 156 A.M.A.J. 1301
(1954). "From a medical standpoint, the taking and transfusion of blood have
evolved from difficult to relatively simple technique, while at the same time the
number of accidents has apparently increased appreciably. This is characteristic
of medical progress, for as the number of lifesaving procedures increase the
number of accidents tend to increase even though the ratio of accidents to treatment may remain constant or even diminish." 163 A.M.A.J. 283, 288. "Many
of the accidents that have occurred are directly attributable to untrained interns
and physicians who performed these tests at night or on holidays, in the absence
of regularly assigned technicians." Id. at 283. "Probably the most serious risk
relating to blood transfusion and one that defies medical science and preventive
measures is the danger of transmitting hepatitis. Careful screening and questioning of donors may to a limited degree lessen this risk." Id. at 285. For a
discussion of the risks and dangers in blood transfusions and present medical
research being done concerning detection of hepatitis, see Life, Feb. 15, 1963,
p. 70. See also Medicolegal Aspects of Blood Transfusions, 16 Current Medicine
for Attorneys 35 (1957) ; Tortious Aspects of Blood Donations'and Blood Transfusions, 2 CURRENT MEDICINE FOR ATTORNEYS 38 (1953) ; Hemolytic Transfusions
Reactions-Medicolegal Aspects, 2 J. OF FORENSIC MEDICINE 78 (1955) ; 6
LAWYER'S MEDICAL CYCLOPEDIA § 42.33 (1961); Blood Transfusions - Medicolegal Responsibilities, (March) MEDICAL TRIAL TEcHNIQuE Q. 31 (1958);
Responsibilities in Blood Transfusions, (June) MEDICOLEGAL DIGEST 1:21-28
(1960).
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injected it into oil producing formations. Plaintiffs, nearby
property owners who obtained water for their personal uses
from the same sand, alleged that defendant's use of the water
was critically depleting their only available fresh water supply
and had caused them to incur expenses in deepening their own
wells. They further asserted that defendant's needs could be
served by deeper salt water sands readily available to him. Accordingly, they sued for injunctive relief and damages. The
district court sustained defendant's exception of no cause of
action and dismissed the suit. The Second Circuit Court of
Appeal affirmed. Held, ownership of subterranean waters does
not inure automatically to the owner of the land; as with oil
and gas, it is acquired only upon reduction to possession. Furthermore, Civil Code articles 600 and 6611 and R.S. 38:218,2
regarding obstruction, diversion, or retardation of the flow of
watercourses, do not apply to subterranean waters. Therefore,
plaintiffs have no right to protest the drainage of water from
under their land. Adams v. Grisby, 152 So. 2d 619 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1963), writs denied, 153 So. 2d 880 (La. 1963).
Faced with an issue that was res nova in this state, the court
in the instant case swept aside plaintiffs' argument that the
statute and code articles3 relating to passage of water through
different estates was applicable to underground waters, finding
that they referred only to surface drainage. Furthermore, the
court refused to apply these rules by analogy because it felt
compelled to find the nature of such waters to be the same as
that of oil and gas; the landowner has no right to these "fugitive" minerals until they are captured and reduced to posses1. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 660 (1870) : "It is a servitude due by the estate
situated below to receive the waters which run naturally from the estate situated
above, provided the industry of man has not been used to create that servitude.
"The proprietor below is not at liberty to raise any dam, or to make any
other work, to prevent this running of the water.
"The proprietor above can do nothing whereby the natural servitude due by
the estate below may be rendered more burdensome."
Id. art. 661: "He whose estate borders on running water, may use it as it runs,
for the purpose of watering his estate, or for other purposes.
"He through whose estate water runs, whether it originates there or passes
from lands above, may make use of it, while it runs over his lands; but he can
not stop or give it another direction, and is bound to return it to its ordinary
channel, where it leaves his estate."
2. LA. R.S. 38:218 (1950) provides in part: "No person diverting or impeding the course of water from a natural drain shall fail to return the water to its
natural course before it leaves his estate without any undue retardation of the
flow of waters outside of his enclosure thereby injuring an adjacent estate."
3. See notes 1 and 2 supra.
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sion. On the same ground, it held that Civil Code article 6674
was inapposite. This article is the Louisiana counterpart to the
sic utere doctrine of common law- that broad and ambiguous
tenet that a landowner may not use his land so as to injure that
of his neighbor.5
It is suggested that the court was not compelled to find
articles 660 and 661 inapplicable to subterranean waters. Since
many legal problems occasioned by the complexity of today's
society could not have been foreseen when our Civil Code was
drafted almost one hundred and sixty years ago, it has been
advocated that the judiciary should have authority to apply by
analogy general principles underlying code articles to modern
conditionsA Articles 660 and 661 seem to have reference to
the civil law riparian doctrine which prohibits an owner of land
abutting running water from appropriating a quantity so large
as to injure other riparian owners.7 If this underlying principle
were extended to subterranean waters, plaintiffs clearly would
have stated a cause of action. Since article 667 imposes no limitations on the scope of "damage" to a neighbor, it also might be
applicable.8 It is upon this same principle that other American
jurisdictions base the rule, contrary to the holding of this case,
that landowners' right to underground waters are "correlative"
or subject to a "reasonable use."9 It is submitted, however, that
4. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 667 (1870) : "Although a proprietor may
estate whatever he pleases, still he can not make any work on it,
deprive his neighbor of the liberty of enjoying his own, or which
cause of any damage to him."
5. See Comment, 20 LA. L. REV. 378 (1960); Note, 6 LOYOLA
(1951).

do with his
which may
may be the
L. REV. 77

6. See GENY, METHODE D'INTERPR]tTATION ET SOURCES EN DROIT PRivE POSITIF
(AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE no. 107
(1963).
A similar mode of interpretation was applied in the creation of the
concept of the mineral "servitude." See Frost Johnson Lumber Co. v. Salling's

Heirs, 150 La. 756, 91 So. 207 (1922).
7. While there is nothing in the articles explicitly to this effect, they are
apparently interpreted as having such a meaning. See 1 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW
TREATISE (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE)
nos. 2418-19 (1959) ; Agnor, Riparian Rights in the Southeastern States, 5 S.C.
L.Q. 143-44 (1952) ; Comment, 16 LA. L. REV. 501-03 (1956).
8. See note 4 supra. Apparently the court's reasoning is that since the neighbor does not own the water beneath his land, he suffers no "damage" when

deprived of acquiring its ownership by reducing it to possession. Such a restricted
interpretation of the word "damage" in the article does not seem mandatory. The
court itself indicated that it might be applicable to pollution of the water supply
or to waste without any benefit to the one reducing the water to possession.
9. See Gagnon v. French Lick Spring Hotel Co., 163 Ind. 687, 72 N.E. 849
(1904) ; Canada v. City of Shawnee, 179 Okla. 53, 64 P.2d 694 (1936) ; Annot.,
55 A.L.R. 1399-40 (1928) ; 56 Am. Jur. Waters § 93 (1956) ; 93 C.J.S. Waters
§ 93 (1956). However, a contrary interpretation may be indicated by Higgins
Oil & Fuel Co. v. Guaranty Oil Co., 145 La. 233, 239, 82 So. 206, 209 (1919),
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the course taken by the court has the better practical result. As
indicated in the decision, to allow relief in such a case would

compel entrance of the judiciary into a long series of complicated and technical regulations - a scheme not best effected by
the judicial process. Such regulation, like that of fugacious
hydrocarbons, should be left to regulatory agencies.
While both the state constitution and the Conservation Act
provide that the Department of Conservation has jurisdiction

over the water resources of the state,'0 the commissioner's
actual authority to manage and regulate such resources is extremely limited. First, it appears that he has been given no
authority to issue orders and regulations dealing with any of
the resources under the department's jurisdiction except as
might be incident to preventing waste of oil and gas." Consequently, withdrawal of water for uses other than those in the oil
and gas industry is apparently free from regulation. Second, even
as to the oil and gas industry, the commissioner has no general
2
or express authority to regulate depletion of water supplies.1
While the commissioner may have limited power to regulate
depletion of water resources in situations such as presented by
the instant case through the broad grant of authority "to regulate secondary recovery methods,"' 3 the subtle nature of this
wherein the court, obiter dictum, quotes an illustration of the sic utere principle
given by the French commentator Laurent: "An owner constructing works on
his land diminishes the volume of a spring the benefit of which his neighbor
has been having. He is within his right. If he thereby causes an injury to his
neighbor, the latter cannot complain; for he has not the absolute ownership of
the waters."
10. LA. CONST. art. VI, § 1(A), (B) provide that the Wildlife and Fisheries
Commission and the Forestry Commission are charged with the management of
the state's wildlife and the practice of forestry, respectively. Subsection C provides that all other natural resources are placed under the Department of Conservation. LA. R.S. 30:1 (1950) provides in part that "all natural resources of
the state not within the jurisdiction of other state departments or agencies are
within the jurisdiction of the department."
11. See LA. R.S. 30:2, 4 (1950).
12. See id. 30:4.
13. Id. 30:4(C) provides: "[The commissioner has authority] to regulate secondary recovery methods, including the introduction of gas, air, water, or other
substances into producing formations." The question would be whether this
language is broad enough to include regulations for purposes of water conservation as well as that of oil and gas. While it is true that the commissioner's
regulatory powers appear confined to the general area of preventing waste of oil
and gas (see note 11 supra and accompanying text), two closely related powers
specifically delegated to him indicate that he may also have a right to regulate
for conservation of water in certain instances. Id. 30:4(C) (1) provides that
the commissioner has authority "to require the drilling, casing, and plugging of
wells to be done in such a manner as . . .to prevent the pollution of fresh water
supplies by oil, gas, or salt water." Id. 30:4(C) (3) provides that he has authority "to prevent wells from being drilled, operated, and produced in a manner to
cause injury to neighboring leases or property." (The "wells" referred to here
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basis for regulation suggests its inadequacy. Thus, legislative
action granting express regulatory powers seems to be the
preferable solution to the problem presented here as well as
those involved in other water resource disputes.
At least twenty-three states have already recognized the
growing importance of their underground fresh water resources
and have enacted statutes governing their distribution and protection. 14 While it is true that Louisiana is unusually blessed

with bounteous water supplies, it is submitted that cases do
arise, and with increasing industrialization will arise more often
in the future, when large consumers in one area provoke shortages. The possibility that industrial installations will be pitted
against each other, or against farming or the domestic con-

sumer, is not remote. 15 Relief should be available to the landare not water wells but oil and gas wells. It would seem that depletion or pollution of a landowner's water supply could be construed to be an "injury to neighboring leases or property.") Since the commissioner has authority to act for the
protection of water resources in these two instances, he may possibly have the
same power in regulating a secondary recovery.
As a possible indication that the authority "to regulate secondary recovery
methods" may be given a restricted meaning, one court has implied that the power
to "regulate" does not include the power to compel participation in a secondary
recovery program. Hunter v. Hussey, 90 So. 2d 429, 433 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1956).
LA. R.S. 30:5(C) authorizes the commissioner, under certain conditions, to
require the unit operation of any pool or of two pools in the same field in connection with a program of pressure maintenance or secondary recovery upon application of any interested party. Conceivably, the commissioner could refuse to
issue such an order if he did not approve of a proposed source of water for a
plan of water injection. Any power of regulation derived from this subsection,
however, would only be concurrent with the more embracive authority "to regulate secondary methods" found in subsection 4(C) (10).
14. Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-301 to -324 (1956) ; Colorado, COLO.
REV.
STAT. ANN.
§§ 147-19-1 to -15 (Supp. 1960); Florida, FLA. STAT.
§§ 373.071-.251 (1960) ; Hawaii, HAWAII REV. LAWS §§ 87B-1 to -36 (Supp.
1961) ; Idaho, IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 42-204 to -239 (Supp. 1963) ; Indiana, IND.
ANN. STAT. §§ 27-1301 to -1316 (1960) ; Iowa, IOWA CODE §§ 455A.1 to .39
(Supp. 1963) ; Kansas, KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 82a-701 to -725 (Supp. 1961) ;
Maryland, MD. ANN. CODE art. 66C, §§ 718-755 (1957) ; Minnesota, MINN. STAT.
§§ 105.37-.79 (Supp. 1961) ; Montana, MONT. REV. CODEs ANN. §§ 89-2911 to
-2936 (Supp. 1963) ; Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 534.010-.190 (1961) ; New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 58, §§ 4A-1 to -28 (Supp. 1962) ; New Mexico, N.M.
STAT. ANN. §§ 75-11-1 to -36 (Supp. 1963); New York, N.Y. CoNsERv. LAW
§§ 400-476 (Supp. 1963) ; North Dakota, N.D. CENT. ANN. CODE §§ 61-02-01 to
-74 (1960) ; Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, §§ 1071-1079 (Supp. 1962) ; Oregon,
ORE. REV. STAT. tit. 45, ch. 536.010-558.990 (1961) ; South Dakota, S.D. CODE
§§ 61.0401-0430 (Supp. 1960) ; Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 73-1-1 to -12-3 (1953) ;
Washington, WAsH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 90.44.010-.250 (1962) ; Wisconsin, WIs.
STAT. ANN. § 144.03(6), (8) (1957) ; Wyoming, WYo. STAT. ANN.
§ 41-121 to
-128 (1957).
15. E;g., the Louisiana Department of Public Works cited these conditions in
its 1956 report to the legislature:
"In Baton Rouge water levels in wells 450 to 700 feet deep have declined from
a level near the land surface to about 200 feet below the land surface in recent
years.
"In the area west of Lake Charles where the principal industries are located,
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owner who is deprived of receiving a fair share of the waters
beneath his land. To this end it is submitted that some sort of
legislative scheme should be enacted which would specifically
empower the commissioner of conservation to make the requisite
findings, orders, and regulations necessary for equitable solution of water shortage problems whenever they arise and what is more important - for the administration of these resources in such a manner as to eliminate the possibility of their
occurrence.
Wendell G. Lindsay, Jr.

WORKMEN'S

COMPENSATION-

CREDIT AGAINST LIABILITY

FOR

WAGE PAYMENTS TO RETAINED EMPLOYEES'

If following convalescence for an industrial accident an injured employee is rehired by his former employer and thereafter
seeks workmen's compensation payments, questions inevitably
water levels in wells 200, 500, and 700 feet deep were a few feet above the land
surface in 1905, whereas at present (1955) the levels are as much as 50 feet below the surface in wells screened in the "200-foot" sand, 85 feet below the surface
in wells screened in the "500-foot" sand, and as much as 70 feet below the surface in wells screened in the "700-foot" sand. This is the result of an average
daily pumpage of about 60 million gallons a day for all purposes for the past
decade."
"In southwestern Louisiana, where the average daily pumpage amounts to
about 530 million gallons, or about 1,600 acre-feet, there has been an average
annual decline of about 1.2 feet per year for the past ten years. Owing to local
concentration of pumping and poor well spacing there have been a number of
local problems, such as decreasing yield from wells and excessive lowering of
water levels. However, there has been no excessive regional lowering, and none is
anticipated at the present rate of pumping. It is estimated that an average of
only about 10 acre-feet of ground water is being removed daily from storage. This
amounts to less than 1 percent of the annual average of 596,000 acre-feet of
ground water being pumped for all purposes in southwestern Louisiana. In other
words, more than 99 percent of the water pumped is replenished by recharge.
"Owing to increased pumping at Monroe and vicinity, there has been a continuous water-level decline in wells screened in the principal sands, which range
in depth from 450 to 950 feet. Since 1946, the average rate of decline has been
4 feet per year. At present (1954) the water level is about 120 feet in wells near
the periphery of the area of heavy withdrawal, and about 220 feet in the area of
heavy withdrawal." LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS, WATER-A
SPECIAL REPORT TO THE LOUISIANA LEGISLATURE 27 (1956). See DEPARTMENT
OF CONSERVATION, LOUISIANA GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, and LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT
OF PUBLIC WORKS, WATER RESOURCES PAMPHLETS 1-10 (1954-61) and WATER
RESOURCES BULLETINS 1-2 (1960-61); LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
SPECIAL REPORT TO THE LOUISIANA LEGISLATURE (1956) ;
WORKS, WATER -A
LOUISIANA LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, WATER PROBLEMS IN THE SOUTHEASTERN
STATES (1957). See generally COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, STATE ADMINISTRATION OF WATER RESOURCES (1957) ; Martz, Water for Mushrooming Popu-

lations, 62 W. VA. L. REV. 1 (1959).
1. The term "retained employee" is used to refer to an employee who has re-

